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Introduction 
 
When the war against Iraq began in the night of 19-20 March 2003, Greek public opinion 
expressed its strong opposition through mass demonstrations and in the media. The 
government, which was holding the Presidency of the EU (European Union) Council at 
the time, engaged in a delicate balancing act: opposition to any unilateral use of force, 
trying to keep the EU united, and at the same time pleasing the Americans without being 
seen to doing so. The official position was that Greece was opposed to the war. Greek 
Premier Costas Simitis declared a few days in the war: ‘Our policy is a policy of peace’2. 
Earlier he had not only repeated his opposition to any military action without UN 
authorization, but also claimed that the EU was united on that approach, and that the 
presence of Britain, France, Germany and Spain on the UN Security Council 
strengthened the Union in its actions and decisions (sic). He fully committed the Greek 
Presidency to produce a common EU stance on world affairs3. Later he had also stated 
that: ‘Our position is that violence is the last resort and this last resort needs to be 
sanctioned by the United Nations’4. All major political parties agreed. Only extreme left 
and leftist parties (in the Greek Parliament, the Communist KKE and the Left Coalition 
Party Synaspismos) criticised the ‘hypocrisy’ of the government and other parties for 
letting the Americans use their bases in Greece5. Greek academics were also quick to 
show their unanimous condemnation of the US-led attack (see the views of seven 
historians and international relations experts in Kathimerini6). As most European public 
                                                 
1 During 2002-03, Dr Stavridis was Onassis Foundation Fellow, EKEM, Athens, and Hellenic 
Observatory Honorary Fellow, LSE European Institute, London. These are the author’s own views and 
do not represent those of any institutions or of any other individual. Therefore the usual proviso about 
responsibility applies here too. 
2 Kathimerini/English edition, 28 March 2003. The Kathimerini’s English edition is published with the 
International Herald Tribune as a daily supplement in Greece. 
3 his interview [in Greek] in EuroMagazine, February 2003, pp 6-10. See also Foreign Minister 
Papandreou’s interview in Kathimerini (26 January 2003 [in Greek]. 
4 Kathimerini/English edition, 19 March 2003. 
5 see Kathimerini/English edition, 28 March 2003. 
6 Sunday 30 March 2003 [in Greek]. 
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opinions also supported the so-called ‘no war’ movement, it was quickly pointed out in 
Greece (media, but also my own research interviews - see list in Appendix 1) that, 
contrary to the 1999 Kosovo war, Greek public opinion was, for once, in sink with the 
rest of the EU (European Union) public opinions. 
 
The related questions of whether there was, at long last, evidence of a European (read: 
EU) voice in international affairs and of how far Greek foreign policy has become 
Europeanised are worth considering. The former question quickly dissolved on the 
‘Letter of Eight’, which supported the US action7. Transatlantic relations reached a new 
low and the work of the European Convention on the Future of Europe in general and 
its debates on the CFSP and ESDP in particular encountered numerous obstacles8. This 
situation led Alain Touraine to ask if ‘Europe actually existed’9. Stanley Hoffmann wrote 
that ‘the split within the EU over Iraq is clearly a disaster’10. ‘Mr PESC/CFSP’, Javier 
Solana, accepted that he had failed to produce a EU consensus11. There were bitter 
exchanges between France and Britain, which meant that the ‘Entente cordiale’ had 
turned into an ‘Entente Glaciale’12. It also led French foreign minister Dominique de 
Villepin to argue that: 
‘[w]e well understand the domestic pressure being put on the British government. 
But these remarks are not worthy of a friendly nation and a European partner’13. 
 
Giles Merritt summed up the situation as follows:  
‘Europeans are shocked by the scale of their own disarray over the Iraq crisis, 
and by the depth of the rifts that have opened up inside the European Union’14. 
 
The Greek Presidency made the most of the above as it presented its ‘unbiased’ position 
on the question of the war in Iraq as a necessary obligation that stemmed from the need 
to preside over the EU for the period January-June 2003. What is conveniently ignored is 
that Greece allowed the Americans to use its bases in Greece (mainly the US naval 
facilities in Souda Bay in Crete), that PM Simitis consistently stated that Greece was 
                                                 
7 see Especial Irak, February 2003: http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/catala/obs. 
8 I will limit myself here to just quote several of the titles of articles published in the influential Le 
Monde: L‘ EUROPE DECHIREE; LA CRISE IRAQUIENNE BRISE LES REVES DE DIPLOMATIE 
COMMUNE EUROPEENNE; L’EUROPE DE L’IMPUISSANCE ET DE LA DIVISION; L’UNITE 
DE L’EUROPE EN LAMBEAUX. 
9 El Pais, 20.01.03. 
10 EUSA Review, Spring 2003, p.3. 
11 El Pais, 25 and again 26 February 2003. 
12 Le Monde, 22 July 2003. 
13 International Herald Tribune, 20 March 2003. 
14 ‘Bickering Europe needs a new doctrine’, International Herald Tribune, 14 March 2003. 
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opposed to the war and therefore aligned himself with the Franco-German axis within 
the EU, that Foreign Minister George Papandreou acted as a bridge with the USA (hence 
his nickname of ‘the American’), and that (then) Socialist Party (PASOK) Secretary 
General Costas Laliotis led anti-war rallies in the centre of Athens. 
 
This rather confusing state of affairs was presented by many an observer as a result of 
the need to continue in the anti-US tradition that prevails in Greece, keep a balancing act 
because of, but equally thanks to, the EU Presidency, and, at the same time, as an 
expression of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. What was conveniently 
ignored was the fact that 18 governments out of the enlarged (in the future) 27-strong 
EU supported the USA. So much for EU consistency, so much for Europeanisation, and 
so much for the democratic disjunction15 between the EU governments and their 
populations. One must also be rather careful about the role of public opinion in foreign 
policy, in particular its volatility. Hence, my interest in trying to make sense of the Greek 
situation. In particular, I was rather surprised by the 100% unanimity among academic 
elites against the war. There was no sign of any dithering whatever the grounds, as was 
clearly the case in the USA and in other EU countries16.  
 
As a result, I was particularly interested in the role of academia in Greek foreign policy. 
Greece is a small country by international standards, but a medium one with the EU.17 
The objective of this working paper is to present and assess the views of academics on 
the question of whether Greek foreign policy has become Europeanised. I will not 
address the question of what Europeanisation means18. This study results from the award 
of an Onassis Foundation Foreign Fellowship in 2002-03, which was held at EKEM 
(Hellenic Centre for European Studies) in Athens for six months during the period 
                                                 
15 Stavridis, 1993a, pp 129-133. For a comprehensive discussion of the democratic deficit in the EU, 
see Stavridis and Verdun, 2001. 
16 On the American debate, see ‘DECHIREMENTS AMERICAINS’, Le Monde [Section: ‘Horizons’], 
30 April 2003). On France, see the Moisi-Andreani articles in Le Monde, 17 June 2003.  Dominique 
Moisi of the Institut Français de Relations Internationales argued that ‘CETTE DIPLOMATIE QUI 
N’A PAS ACCRU NOTRE PRESTIGE ; Whereas the French Foreign Office Forward Planning Unit 
Director called it ‘UNE ACTION HONORABLE ET EFFICACE’. 
17 In terms of population at least, almost 11 million Greeks put the country 7th in the current EU list. 
Greece will be 8th in an enlarged 25 next year, and 9th in an EU with 27 members later this decade. 
Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and after the next enlargement(s), Poland and 
Romania have larger populations than Greece. The Treaty of Nice has redistributed votes and seats 
with a population bias and the Convention has worked on the introduction of a double majority, one of 
states and one of populations (8 out of 15 and 60% of the EU citizenship). 
18 See Stelios Stavridis (forthcoming), The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a preliminary 
literature review. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/Stavridis.pdf 
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March-September 2003. The venue and the duration of the fellowship are important. 
First, Professor Ioakimidis, who among other responsibilities is the Director of EKEM, 
is an expert on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy19. His extensive contribution 
to the study of the subject was acknowledged by all of the interviewed academics. It was 
therefore not a coincidence that I applied to the Onassis Foundation to support a 
research study visit at EKEM. Second, the duration of the fellowship is important 
because it meant that it coincided with the Greek Presidency, with part of the European 
Convention (its most interesting stage with the finalization of the draft 
Constitution/Constitutional Treaty), and with the war in Iraq and all the EU divisions it 
has generated. After reviewing part of the existing literature and discussing the issue at 
length with Professor Ioakimidis, my practical choice was to concentrate on the views of 
academics rather than to try and carry out a comprehensive analysis of what is after all a 
huge subject. It is therefore a qualitative assessment of the issue at hand. It is also hoped 
that it does not amount to an ‘academic view’ in the negative sense of the term, but that 
it rather represents a fair and accurate assessment of the views of academic colleagues. 
The study also proposes an agenda for future research on the subject. 
 
This paper consists of three parts. The first part examines the views and opinions of a 
number of academics, both established senior staff and upcoming younger ones, who 
kindly accepted to be interviewed extensively for this study [a list is provided at the end 
of this paper20]. The second part presents my critical analysis of a number of points 
raised in the interviews. The third and concluding part refers to future research, based 
both on the methodology adopted in this work and in a proposed methodology entitled 
‘the pendulum test’.  
 
 1. Academic views on the Europeanisation of Greek FP 
 
Introduction and methodology 
Academics play a priori a much bigger role in Greek society than in other EU states. This 
situation results from a number of reasons, which range from the socio-political status of 
academic professors in Greek society, but also from their importance in several political 
parties after the restoration of democracy in 1974 and in particular in the PASOK party. 
                                                 
19 See Bibliography for details. 
20 In this appendix I also include a number of events I attended during my stay in Athens as further 
sources of information. 
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PASOK has been in power since 1981 barring a small interruption in 1989-1993. Because 
of their many jobs (a Southern European phenomenon), academics often act as advisors 
to politicians or government officials, or, sometimes actively participate in Greek politics. 
To name but a few examples, this is the case for Professors Rozakis, Papadimitriou, and 
Venizelos (a government minister) for PASOK, and for Professors Alogoskoufis (an 
MP) and Valinakis (now the party foreign affairs spokesman) for New Democracy. Here 
one must stress the different statuses from party members to advisors to a ministry or to 
a specific minister. 
 
The main reason for conducting a series of selected interviews, in addition to the stated 
limitations of time, has to do with the fact that interviewing has become a key element in 
the study of foreign policy analysis. The interviewing of elites is important not only for 
their expert knowledge but also as ‘opinion shapers’21. One should bear in mind the long 
term effect of academics as much as their short term impact on public opinion at large 
but also on elites perceptions be they political, governmental etc. The latter mainly occur 
via numerous interventions in the media, be it the written press or television. This 
activity has now become a favourite pastime for many an academic in Greece. The 
former refers to the education and teaching dimension of academic life. Most politicians 
and other practitioners (diplomats, party officials, advisers, etc) now have a university 
education. Thus, academics, wearing their lecturing hats this time round, do mark 
generations to come, although it is admittedly more difficult to assess their actual impact. 
Finally, and that point complements the previous two, the written work of academics 
does inform the wider debate (including policy recommendations), be it at the theoretical 
level or at the empirical one. ‘Second jobs’ are also common among academics, often 
related to actual policy making. As usual, there is a positive and a negative dimension to 
this situation. The positive element is that Greek academics may be closer to ‘the real 
world’ than is the case in other EU states (but not in the USA where academics and 
practitioners enjoy a close relationship and often move between the two categories). 
However, there might be an element of clientelistic politics too here. Also this close 
relationship with political parties and governments may lead to an apologetic role in 
some academic and other writings. I leave these questions open. As for wider access to 
public opinion, there are regular columns in the press for academics, but one needs to 
                                                 
21 See the expert survey on EU party positions, www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data.htm. It is also mentioned 
in Schmitt (2003) and also at least once explicitly and several times implicitly during interviewing 
(Moschonas). 
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add that the real issue is whether the Greek public reads them or not (Greek newspapers 
circulation is one of the lowest, if not the lowest, in Europe in comparative population 
terms). 
 
Methodologically speaking, I preferred an open-end approach to the interviewing 
process, thus without a list of specific questions (see indicative list in appendix 3). In 
terms of responses, I contacted by email (a Europeanised way of contact nowadays in the 
academic community) 25 academics over a period of five weeks (late May-June 2003). 15 
of them (just over 60%) responded positively to my request for interview. In addition to 
lengthy discussions with Professor Ioakimidis, 13 such interviews materialised during the 
period 28 May-16 July 2003, and one in September. They were carried out in Athens and 
lasted between one hour and two hours. 
 
As for the selection of the case-studies, I based my choice on the existing literature but 
made sure to ask all interviewees about any other areas they would have liked to 
comment upon. From the literature, Ioakimidis defines as ‘ethnika themata’ Greece’s 
relations with neighbouring countries, most notably Turkey and Cyprus22. He also adds 
relations with the USA through NATO or at the bilateral level, as well as the Balkans23. 
Most other observers also agree. Thus, in a number of collective volumes on Greek FP24, 
the main areas of interest for Greek FP reproduce the same, by now familiar, topics: 
• Turkey, Cyprus 
• the Balkans 
• USA. 
 
It is worth noting that the interviews were conducted in Greek, although two of the 
interviewees preferred to use English (Couloumbis and Keridis) when they were 
informed that the study would be published in English. Those using Greek did however 
often use English words and expressions throughout the interviews. Some did so more 
than others. This can be interpreted in part because they knew my work will be published 
in English, and in part because of their own respective place of study (Tziampiris for 
instance has made all his studies in the USA and in the UK). I mention this here as to 
                                                 
22 Ioakimidis (2000: 363). 
23 Ibid.: 364. 
24 Couloumbis, Kariotis and Bellou 2003, Mitsos and Mossialos 2000; Lesser et al. 2001; Featherstone 
and Ifantis 1996. 
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whether there is a Europeanisation (read: English25) of language as well. Terminology is 
also often related to where and when one has learnt his/her ‘trade’. My own transcripts 
were made in English from the notes, mainly in English again, taken during interviews. 
This study was meant from the start to be written in English. A final comment on this 
aspect of the question might be for sociologists to investigate whether the place of study 
(outside Greece) has an impact on the way academics later assess the Europeanisation of 
Greek foreign policy. I leave this question open but simply note that it is linked to the 
question of the socialization of elites. 
 
What follows reproduces a number of points/quotes taken from the interviewing 
process.  I have tried to be as accurate as possible but I did not use a tape recorder to 
allow for as open a discussion as possible. 
 
The findings 26 
The interviewed academics could be split them into three groups:  
• The optimists who claim that the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy is a 
positive development, that it has now, finally, fully materialized, and that it can 
no longer be reversed. 
• The sceptics who remain circumspect, be it in general (about the Europeanisation 
of Greece) or in particular (FP). 
• The critics who deny there has really been a Europeanisation of FP. 
 
In terms of interviewees, out of 15, there were 9 who belonged to the first group, 2 
(Moschonas and Tsakaloyannis) to the second group, and finally two to the last group 
(Huliaras and Tsardanidis). So, a clear majority claims that there has been such a process, 
at least in FP. 
 
It is also interesting to mention that almost all interviewees consider foreign policy to be 
one of the most ‘successful’ areas of the Europeanisation process in Greece. In fact, 
there was near-consensus that Foreign Policy is the most successful area of 
Europeanisation in Greece. Some even argued the only success story of Europeanisation 
in Greece to date. FP was also identified as an initiator of Europeanisation in Greece. 
                                                 
25 See Abram de Swaan, ‘Celebrating many tongues – in English’, International Herald Tribune, 25 
September 2003. 
26 when just names appear in brackets it means ’interviews 2003’ (see appendix 1 for details). 
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Some contrasted it to a lack of similar progress in the internal policy field, with the (very) 
notable exception of the adoption of the euro (EMU). Thus, attempts at privatisation 
and other restructuring efforts in the Greek economy continue to be major obstacles for 
the Europeanisation of Greece (see also Keridis 2003). 
 
On Greece and Europeanisation in general, there was emphasis on a change of ‘style’ 
in the way politics are conducted away from a rather confrontational to a more 
consensual type of conduct (Keridis).  The use of ‘coalition-building’ in the EU was also 
stressed (Keridis, Tsardanidis, Tziampiris). Economic progress, and in particular the 
introduction of the ‘euro’ in 2001, were also mentioned (Keridis). Others disagreed 
(Moschonas, Tsakaloyannis) and preferred to stress the social implications and costs of 
EU membership. There was a clear stress on the historic dimension of the question 
when applied to Greece and in particular its reference to Greece’s belonging to the West 
or to the East, i.e. Europe or the Orient (Botsiou, Keridis). The latter is an issue that 
dates back to Greece’s independence in 1821-1830, but an issue that continued well after 
the mid-1920s when Greece suffered what is known as the ‘mikrasiatiki katastrofi’ of 
Asia Minor in 1923.  Thus, this identity question has informed all recent debates 
including the current one on Europeanisation. It contains a number of ‘ideational’ issues 
such as those on the re-definition of the nation-state, the role of the Church, and that of 
a multi-cultural Greek society, mainly through recent foreign immigration (Botsiou, 
Keridis). There was also some confusion between the various concepts of 
Europeanisation, modernization and democratisation. The last two concepts have a 
particular connotation in Greece as it is a country that gained independence late and has 
only made economic and political improvements in the post-1945 era. 
 
I reproduce verbatim (from my notes), the various definitions of Europeanisation given by 
the interviewees (alphabetical order). 
 
BOTSIOU: convergence of economic and political policies and development of a European identity 
that combines with national identities. A positive but not above (elevated) level, a synthesis of national 
identities, no more wars, cooperation. Fusion in some areas, practical, euro and Schengen, but also 
identities but here it is a qualitative shift. 
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BELLOU: adjustment/adaptation (change) of behaviour and institutional set up in member states to 
rules, principles and other values as defined by the EU. Including candidates states. A process that is 
dynamic and still in its early stages. Acquis communautaire as a system. 
 
CHRYSSOCHOOU: a process of institutional harmonisation and inclusion/adaptation of European 
norms, principles and rules. 
 
COULOUMBIS:  
• democracy, rules, institutions 
• convergence 
• functional cooperation 
• transcending borders 
• freeing the national definition of the national interest from territorial considerations. 
 
IFANTIS: in policy making (not in particular order) harmonisation, common standards, loyalty to 
European system of cooperation, solidarity, definition of European interest (EU). More difficult in terms 
of defence, only minimum solidarity is possible, not a European defence, nor is it possible to adapt to EU 
norms in defence. (sceptical realist approach). 
 
IFESTOS: To what extent does one gets closer to Europe, its common interests and policies. Need to 
define the latter of course and that is not easy (especially for Greece). Methodologically difficult. A 
question for the elites. 
 
KERIDIS: moving away from a certain nationalist, inward-looking, traditionalist, xenophobic, 
reactionary/reactive, siege-mentality, zero-sum game, hard-core realist discourse -> to a more liberal, 
positive-sum game, post-nationalist, sovereignty pooling, interests/values/identities overlapping, 
cosmopolitan, outward looking, proactive, much more confident foreign policy. 
 
MOSCHONAS: roots in hermeneutic example of modernization with the specificity of the EU 
dimension, acquis communautaire. Need to adapt national rules to EU practice. 
 
PERRAKIS: moving away from ethno-centric criteria in policy making towards those of the EU and 
other European institutions (Council of Europe, OSCE). 
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TSAKALOYANNIS: a process that produces synergy with partners and leads to (Monnet approach) 
our problems are common, more than just mere competition between member’s views. EU institutional 
framework allows success in objectives and achieving goals that cannot be done alone. 
 
There was overwhelming consensus on the positive side of Europeanisation. Many 
argued that in fact the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy was the most visible side 
of that process and one to be welcomed (Botsiou, Couloumbis, Keridis, Moschonas).  
Most interviewees confirmed therefore that there has been a Europeanisation of Greek 
foreign policy, especially with regards to Turkey/Cyprus and the Balkans. Even one of 
the academics I contacted (but did not manage to organise a formal research interview 
with him) told me ‘of the top of his head’ that ‘Cyprus/Turkey and FYROM (‘Ta Skopia’ 
in Greek)’ where the obvious candidates for illustrating empirically where Greek foreign 
policy had indeed Europeanised (6 June 2003 in Athens). Thus, in terms of Greek FP 
policy areas, Turkey was seen as the most Europeanised nowadays (Bellou, Botsou, 
Couloumbis, Ifantis, Keridis, Tziampiris), followed by the Balkans (Bellou, Couloumbis, 
Chryssochoou, Tskaloyannis, Tziampiris), and by Cyprus (Bellou, Chryssochoou, 
Ifestos). It is worth noting that Ifestos’ comments on Cyprus were based on the fact that 
he sees such a Europeanisation as being the result of Greece using the ‘weaknesses’ of 
the EU system and in particular the prospects offered by EU enlargement (EU linkage 
politics and package deals). As for Tziampiris’ comments on the Balkans, he argues that 
even Greece’s public opinion now accepts that the 1993-94 policy towards FYROM was 
a ‘fiasco’ due to ‘neurosis’. Keridis sees Greece’s policy towards Turkey as ‘emblematic’ 
of this new Europeanised approach and specifically mentions George Papandreou as its 
embodiment, after the ‘cathartic effect’ of the 1999 Ocalan crisis. 
 
Admittedly, there were some qualifications linked to both general concerns about 
identity, the relative weakness of the economy (‘there has been no substantial 
convergence a-la Maastricht’, Moschonas; also Tsakaloyannis’ worries about the absence 
of a welfare state system in Greece), and more specific ones about the success of such a 
Europeanised FP. Particular attention was given to Turkey and Cyprus. The USA 
remains the main actor: ‘it is not a coincidence that after the Imia crisis in 1996, Simitis 
went to the Vouli to thank the Americans’ (Moschonas). ‘The pro-Turkish line has not 
paid off’ (Tsakaloyannis). Others fundamentally disagreed with that approach and 
claimed that one of the success of Europeanisation in Greece is that now the Cyprus 
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Problem and relations with Turkey are no longer national issues but have become 
European (EU) ones. The same applies to the Balkans and in particular the Macedonian 
question. These are positive developments (Bellou, Botsiou, Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, 
Keridis, Tziampiris). Some stressed the limits of Europeanisation in defence and security 
matters (Ifantis, Ifestos). But this dimension of the question falls beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
It was also agreed that Europeanisation in Greek FP was a dynamic process. Some 
argued it has been achieved in foreign policy and that it represent a permanent 
achievement nowadays (Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, Botsiou, Keridis, Tziampiris). It is 
important to note (I will return to this below) that there was a lot of agreement about the 
fact that the process of Europeanisation was elite-driven (importance of individuals27), 
that it had been ‘imposed’ from the top, and that it was largely superficial because there 
had been no real impact on Greek society (and in particular its administrative system), at 
least as yet.  Here one should stress the importance attached by many interviewees to the 
‘socialisation’ effect of Europeanisation. In particular Tziampiris stressed that we are now 
dealing with a process that goes ‘well above and beyond a mere socialisation effect’.  
Thus, he argued that: 
‘now it is a different strategy altogether. Greece’s national interests are better 
served via multilateral efforts, mainly in the EU, rather than unilateral or bilateral 
ones’. 
 
Europeanisation is also a process that allows for ‘flexible alliances’ with other EU 
partners according to issue-areas: on human rights with Scandinavian countries, on 
federal visions with Germany, on agriculture with France, on defence with large states, 
on structural funds with Southern European states, and on institutional reforms with 
small states (Keridis). 
 
Others stressed the simple fact that there are now Foreign ministers who do speak 
foreign languages (Huliaras). It is equally important to stress (as was indeed noted by 
many an interviewee) the catalytic effect of some events such as the return to democracy 
(1974), the shift to social democracy among Socialist governments in Europe (in the case 
of Greece 1985 but the key event here occurs in Mitterrand’s France in 1982), the Imia 
                                                 
27 To a certain extent this in itself is a negation of Europeanisation, see section 4 below for more 
comments on that particular point. 
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crisis (1996), or the Ocalan fiasco (1999). Needless to say one should also add other 
‘bigger developments’ in the world, such as the end of the Communist bloc and the 
reunification of Europe. 
 
There was clear emphasis on the negative impact of past Greek policies such as the early 
1980s and its plethora of examples: Poland, the Korean jumbo (Tziampiris, Moschonas). 
The East-West divide was also criticised by some as having more to do with anti-US 
rather than anti-European feelings, mainly due to the role of the USA in the Greek junta 
and in Cyprus (Moschonas). 
 
When did Europeanisation start? There were those who view this process as a historic 
one dating back to many centuries, those who see it as a more recent event mainly linked 
to Greece’s return to democracy in 1974 (and the fundamental role played by 
Constantine Caramanlis28), a major ideological shift within the Socialist Party (around 
1985), the appointment of Simitis as PM in 1996 (‘a point of no return’, Chryssochoou), 
or since 1999 and the appointment of George Papandreou as foreign minister following 
the Ocalan fiasco. It is difficult to have a clear view of who dates what where and when 
because all interviewees agreed Europeanisation is a dynamic and multi-faceted process. 
There were also signs of some confusion about Greece’s Europeanisation and its NATO 
membership and the role of the USA in its security policy widely defined but in particular 
with regard to Turkey. This aspect of the question was presented as fundamentally 
problematic by a number of interviewees (especially Ifantis) but not so by others 
(Botsiou, Couloumbis). 
 
In more details (sometimes more than one case put forward), the supporters of the 
‘historic’ dimension of the process of Europeanisation of Greek FP were Botsiou and 
Huliaras, and to a lesser extent Moschonas (modernisation 1960s rather than 1821). 
Those supporting the Caramanlis claim (mid 1970s) were Botsiou and Moschonas. Those 
favouring the PASOK shift in the mid-1980s were Huliaras (*but see also below), 
Ifestos, Moschonas, Perrakis, Tsakaloyannis, Tsardanidis (*but see also below). And, 
finally those who credited Simitis’s efforts and a more recent date (mid to late 1990s) 
were Bellou, Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, Ifantis, Keridis.  
                                                 
28 A link bridge of the Strasbourg EP building has just been named ‘Espace Constantin Caramanlis’, 
Kathimerini/English edition, 8 September 2003. 
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 On the Future of Europe debate (‘what kind of EU?), there was clear consensus that 
Greece is seen as pro-federal, pushing for more integration, especially in defence issues 
(Keridis). This overwhelming pro-Europeanism was contrasted to Greece’s anti-
Americanism. It was also claimed that the real test has yet to come: when Greece 
becomes a net contributor to the EC budget, that is to say when it stops enjoying the 
largesse of other members (Keridis). Few questioned why Greece is in favour of the 
abolition of the veto in EU matters when it goes cold feet on its use in foreign and 
security policy areas (Ifestos). Others claimed that no one really knows what ‘federalism’ 
actually means in Greece because it is no familiar with this kind of political system 
(Botsiou). 
 
There were many explanations on offer for the fact that the Greek Presidency was used 
as a ‘blessing’  (Tziampiris) that allowed for a double (if not triple) language. One argued 
that PASOK is not schizophrenic at all but rather that it has cultivated such a policy over 
the years (‘maverick’, ‘satanic’ were words used by Keridis). There are different 
audiences: a domestic public and an EU one to address. Others suggested that Simitis is a 
‘smart’ politician (Botsiou). Only one interviewee argued that the EU in general, and the 
Greek Presidency in particular, did not have any real impact on public opinion. It is seen 
as ‘boring and technocratic’ and the PASOK government was only trying its best ‘for 
domestic politics and party politics’ (Tsakaloyannis). It was also mentioned that one 
needed to assess the Greek Presidency in relation to other recent presidencies, some of 
which have been rather ‘poor’, e.g. France in 2000 (Ifantis). 
 
Most interviewees insisted on the fact that Greece is a fundamentally anti-American 
country (mainly for its support to the 1967-1974 Greek colonel junta, and its role in the 
1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus). Henry Kissinger is a persona non grata in many a Greek 
circle, contrary to many other EU countries where he is considered as a highly successful 
Secretary of State (in particular: end of conflict in Vietnam and opening to China but also 
his role in the Middle East in the 1973 war). It was stressed that this kind of anti-
Americanism is not the case in other EU states which took an anti-American line on the 
recent conflict in Iraq (2003), for instance in Germany (Keridis), but which are not 
fundamentally anti-US. It was also confirmed that Greece had an ‘underdog’ mentality 
often associating itself with the weak (Keridis interview, for more see Diamandouros’ 
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work which was mentioned in the interviews as a reference point). It was also generally 
agreed that the Greek media were of a poor quality, especially with regard to the 
coverage of the war in Iraq (Botsiou, Keridis). 
 
On other issues worth researching in the future, the following were suggested: ‘anti-
Americanism’, ‘counter-terrorism’, and the ‘the impact of globalisation on the Greek 
psyche’ (Keridis). He also suggested the impact of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. In 
that respect, it is interesting to note that PM Simitis only recently claimed that: 
‘[a]nother issue is especially significant for Greece [in 2004]: the Olympic Games 
(…). The Olympic Games are not only a sports event, they are a social, political 
event which highlights a country and creates opportunities for development … 
That’s where we must succeed’29. 
 
Very few interviewees mentioned that the Europeanisation of a country (in this case 
Greece) also depends on how much the other member states want this process to be 
successfully completed. That it is a dynamic process but that it also depends on 
relationships with other similar processes in other EU states and institutions 
(Tsakaloyannis: ‘Europeanisation is not only a question for the Greeks, do they others 
also want us?’).   
 
Only two interviewees (Huliaras, Tsardanidis) presented a rather damning picture of the 
effects of Europeanisation in Greece in general, and on its FP in particular. It is true that 
others have also expressed several reservations. For instance, Perrakis’ argument was that 
l’intendence ne suit pas! The blame for not following the lead by a few individuals is to be 
shared by the Greek administrative system, the political parties, and other elements of 
society (‘established interests’). Other interviewees, especially when pressed (hence the 
usefulness of face-to-face interviews rather than printed questionnaires), did also accept 
that in fact there was still some way to go. But on the whole there was a rather self-
satisfactory state of affairs. It is therefore worth explaining the dissenting views in more 
detail here, not only because they go against the grain (although one could argue that 
many other interviewees did also agree implicitly when they said that it has been a 
superficial process to date), but also because of what follows in the next section (section 
4) and my own critical assessment of the question. Thus, Tsardanidis argues that Greek 
FP has become ‘Africanized’, ‘Sub-Saharazed’ or ‘Balkanized’ rather than Europeanised. 
                                                 
29 Kathimerini/English edition, 8 September 2003. 
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He claims that corruption and clientelism have been reinforced, rather than weakened by 
Greece’s membership of the EU. Thus, the importance of the state has increased in that 
regard, as has the number of people affected by this process, hence facilitating 
clientelistic practices. This is a point further stressed by Huliaras who argues that whereas 
there was no Greek international development policy prior to 1997, the fact remains that 
45% of Greece’s development assistance is not audited (that is to say the part that does 
not go through the EU)30. Finally, they both stress that there is no evidence of the 
Foreign Ministry and other ministries dealing with EU affairs having been successfully 
Europeanised. 
 
Huliaras also stressed that there are some examples of Europeanised Greek FP but that 
these do not amount to an Europeanisation of Greek FP. The rhetoric may be ‘pro-
Europe’ but the reality remains that Greece is accepting US views because ‘Greece has a 
deep mistrust of the European project in security matters’ (similar views were also 
expressed by Ifantis and Tsakaloyannis). He also criticised the ‘village mentality’ that still 
prevails in Greece (for instance, the continued emphasis on Greek success abroad as if it 
were something special) as backward ‘mimetism’ (i.e. ‘we Greeks can do as well as the 
others’). He did make a direct comparison to current Turkish efforts to join the EU 
direction. Huliaras also recalled that until recently South European EU member states 
were labelled in Brussels as P.I.G.S (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain). Despite these 
criticisms, he accepted that it would be ‘difficult to impose an embargo on a third 
country unilaterally as was the case in 1994 with FYROM’. He also argued that more 
systematic work31 on how the Foreign Ministry functions now could help in identifying if 
there is a trend towards Europeanisation.  
 
Tsardanidis also highlighted another important point: Did Greek policy towards Turkey 
shift first or had the EU moved first? In other words, there is now a link between 
Turkey’s democratisation, its stance on Cyprus and its EU accession prospects but did 
                                                 
30 For more details see his Conference paper ‘The seven paradoxes of Greece’s state development aid’ 
[in Greek], Institute of International Economic Relations’s First Pan-Hellenic Conference on 
International Political Economy, Athens, 19-21 September 2003. 
31 Such an approach could also use more quantitative methods, including a systematic study of how 
many EU committee meetings Greek officials now attend (and compare to past experience), how many 
trips abroad are carried out (especially to Brussels but also to other EU capitals), how much has the use 
of modern technology increased (especially internet), and finally (a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods) how many more Greek proposals are being presented, and accepted (how much 
more confidence Greek negotiators feel they have as compared to previous years). All this to find out if 
Greek participation in EU affairs is now pro-active as opposed to reactive as was the case in the past. 
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the Greeks change tack first (by dropping their opposition to the 1995/6 Customs 
Union) and then got the Cyprus accession promise or was it the other way round? In 
brief, did Greek FP become Europeanised by intent or by duress? 
 
Neither Huliaras nor Tsardanidis were convinced that ‘Europeanisation has materialised 
successfully’. They reflect to a large extent comments made by Ioakimidis in his 1996 
contribution where he mentioned clientelism, a culture of the underdog, and the need for 
foreign protection, as major obstacles to real Europeanisation. What is worrying is that 
they remain current nowadays, i.e. 7 years later. What matters here is not only that this is 
almost a decade later but that these seven years coincide with the so-called 
modernization efforts by the Simitis government.  
 
2. A critical evaluation 
 
What follows makes a number of comments, mainly critical ones but hopefully –and this 
is my clear intention – of a constructive kind, on what was said in the interviews. In other 
words, this section is my own contribution to the academic debate on Europeanisation. 
 
The first of my critical comments refers to a number of contradictions in the debate 
over the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. Has the process been completed or is 
it a dynamic one (i.e. still ongoing)? There was no agreement on this particular point even 
if there was indeed consensus on the fact that there was no going back. I am not 
convinced by this argument that reflects perhaps more wishful thinking than reality. I am 
not implying that I expect a return to more traditional foreign policy in Greece or a re-
nationalisation of foreign policies. But, there are examples, plenty of them for that 
matter, when there has been reversal of the process, be it in the 1996 Imia crisis, or for 
other EU states, as was the case with Spain in the 2002 Perejil crisis32. 
 
Needless to say, I do not expect either that a full Europeanisation of Greek FP will mean 
that all Greek positions on international affairs will become those of the EU. But some 
such effect will need to materialise if my dynamic understanding of Europeanisation is 
correct. I do not expect everyone for instance to agree with MEP Ostlander that a 
settlement to the Cyprus Problem ‘should be made a criterion for evaluating Turkey’s 
                                                 
32 see Monar 2002; Gillespie, 2002, pp 69-70; Soler and Mestres, 2003, pp 7-8. 
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progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria’ or that, as British MEP Theresa 
Villiers has argued, that ‘no date should be set for the opening of accession negotiations 
on Turkish entry to the EU, until Turkish troops leave Cyprus’33. But a closer EU view 
on that of Greece on issue of ‘national interest’ (the so-called ethnika themata) will confirm 
progress towards the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy but also of those of other 
national foreign policies of EU states. A similar argument could be made when for 
instance Turkish violations of Greek air space will no longer consider to be a bilateral 
issue but one of real concern to the EU. The latter question is not unrelated to the lack 
of substantial progress on a security guarantee clause in the EU34. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that when Greek government spokesman Christos Protopapas comments on 
the recent declarations made by Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the 29th 
Anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (a ‘peace operation’ in Erdogan’s own 
words), he says that the Turkish PM ‘provokes all humanity’. But Protopapas then lists 
only the United Nations and not the EU as affected but this ‘provocation’35. 
 
This point relates to the question of where the EU will decide to go in the future. The 
‘Solana paper’ (June 2003), which is seen as a draft strategy paper for the Union, does not 
offer any clear view as to the direction the Europeans will adopt because it represents the 
beginning of a debate, is the result of a compromise between the two different views 
over the Iraq war, and was produced just days prior to the Presidency visit to 
Washington (anything short of pretending to accept some of the views in the current US 
administration in particular with regard to rogue states and use of military force would 
have led to serious problems for President-in-Office Simitis).  
 
There are still diverging views among member states on European defence36, a situation 
that will become even more complicated after enlargement. Most of the governments 
supporting the US-UK view over Iraq came from Central and Eastern Europe. To the 
traditional ‘Europeanist versus Atlanticist’ divide, one must also add the views of the 
former neutral or post neutral or non-allied states37. 
 
                                                 
33 http://www.pio.gov.cy on 29 May 2002. 
34 for more see Chryssochoou, Stavridis and Moschonas 2000. 
35 Kathimerini/English edition, 21 July 2003. 
36 see Howorth, 2000a, Howorth, 2000b, Stavridis, 2001c. 
37 Howorth 2000c, pp 15-24. On this and other aspects of CFSP divisions, see Anderson, 2002, p.190. 
For more dividing lines within the Union and other Western organisations, see Mestres, 2002, p.4; 
Menon and Lipkin, 2003, p.26. 
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My second point refers to the confusion that the term ‘Europeanisation’ creates. In 
most, if not all, interviews there was a slippage, on the one hand, to ‘modernisation’ and 
‘democratisation’, and on the other, to ‘westernisation’ and even ‘globalisation’. In 
particular, many interviewees often appeared unsure if they were referring to 
modernisation or to Europeanisation. Such confusion is not unique among Greek 
academics. It reflects a lack of clarity about what Europeanisation actually means. A good 
example occurred when a French academic revealingly described Chirac’s stance on Iraq 
in 2003 as ‘a Europeanist view’ before he quickly corrected it to ‘or rather a Gaullist 
one’38. Suffice it to say that the concept itself is confusing but still useful. It requires 
further investigation. It also means that more work needs to be done on the way national 
foreign policy priorities and other objectives become fused into those of the EU. This 
will be an easy exercise but such an approach accepts that there is no obvious ‘European 
position’ to start with. It is also shifting sometimes, as was the case in the European 
Parliament with the European stance on the Western Sahara that was the French view 
until Spain joined and then it became the Spanish view39. I do not enter here the debate 
over the discrepancy of views between various EU institutions. Not much work has been 
done on how national positions affect the EU one. To start with problematic FP issues is 
needed and there has been a development in this direction but only recently40. 
 
But more work is still required. Perhaps, ironically, the anecdote of the French 
ambassador in Athens playing with a koboloi (worry beans) during a recent seminar41 
visualises best what I mean by a two-way process of Europeanisation. Europeanisation 
represents not only the domestic adaptation to EU rules and practices, i.e. behaviour, but 
also that such behaviour is equally influenced and informed by national practices. As it is 
incorrectly therefore claimed by the newly-formed Young ECPR Network on 
Europeanisation, Europeanisation is not only ‘the impact of European integration at the 
national level’42. In other words, the domestic impact of Europeanisation is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition. Examples of Europeanisation do not necessarily mean 
that the process itself is finalised and completed. Many interviewees in the ‘optimistic 
                                                 
38 11th Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion in Spetsae, 1-5 July 2003. 
39 Urruela, 1995. 
40 see LSE International Relations Department Conference June 2002: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EuroFPUnit.html#workingpapers. 
41 11th Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion in Spetsae, 1-5 July 2003. 
42 http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/standinggroups/yen/gen_info.htm as printed on 26.8.2003. 
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camp’ appeared not to be fully aware of this important additional dimension to the 
question under study.  
 
Divisions among Europeans cannot be ignored in general but these are important 
elements in an effort to define what constitutes the ‘European’ in a Europeanisation 
process. Thus, on foreign policy and international affairs there is a clear divergence of 
views between the French and the British and the Germans over what kind of Europe 
we want (a super power, a civilian power etc) and what kind of world is desirable, let 
alone feasible (a multipolar one or a multilateral one or a world dominated by the only 
hyperpower?). On all these issues I will not comment, but suffice it to say the existing 
divergences among the governments of the big EU states confirm that a Europeanisation 
of foreign policy, let alone defence, remains problematic.43  
 
Another good illustration of the issue of how difficult it is to define what is ‘European’ 
and how to achieve a common European stance can be found in the European 
Parliament’s debates in early 2003. Whereas in January the EP had passed a resolution 
condemning any unilateral use of force against Iraq, at the end of March, it was so split 
that it was unable to adopt any resolution on the subject44. Some observers/actors 
blamed British Labour MEPs clearly and squarely, for instance, PASOK MP Milena 
Apostolaki45. Although there is some truth in her allegation, the picture is much more 
complex than that46. 
 
Moreover, this difficulty in identifying a European interest not only points to the need 
for such an exercise to be carried out (c.f. the recent Convention work) but also to try 
and avoid phrases such as the ‘Champions of Europe’ when such views only describe the 
stance of a given government (or governments) at a given time: thus, Daniel Vernet’s 
analysis47 refers to the Germans and the French as ‘champions d’Europe’ for their stance 
on the 2003 Iraq war misses completely the fact that a European stance is not 
predetermined but the result of a long process. Vernet does however hint in the right 
                                                 
43 For the Blair-Chirac opposition see Le Monde, 30 April 2003; see also Le Monde, 17 June 2003. For 
the French-German divide see International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2003. The overall picture is even 
more complicated when one hears that Paris and Moscow agree on everything ‘JUSQU’AU 
MOINDRE DETAIL’, Le Monde, 10 July 2003. For a different view discrediting the myth of a Paris-
Moscow axis, see Daniel Vernet, Le Monde, 29 July 2003. 
44 Le Monde, 28.03.03. 
45 Greek NET TV, 30.3.03. 
46 for details see Stavridis and Retta 2003. 
47 Le Monde, 13.3.03. 
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direction when he argues that without the UK there cannot be a European defence 
dimension. Thus, all national views will need to be included. This discussion is important 
but it falls beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the international situation 
is rather more complex and difficult than to argue that: 
‘Europe will follow France (…): a Europe with an independent policy, exercising 
an equal influence on international affairs, probably through primarily political 
and economic means, rather than military means. That is just what the United 
States does not want’48. 
 
Vernet’ s arguments about the reasons why Spain, Italy and some central European states 
backed the Americans over the Iraq war concentrate too much on the negative points 
(fear of the Germans, the Soviets/Russians, and the Franco-German axis within the 
Union). He forgets that such an approach fails to explain why Britain joined in (or 
Australia for that matter) and he ignores all the more positive arguments about a new 
world order, which may require pre-emptive action49. Thus, the real issue may not be 
about US unilateral action but about pre-emptive action, ideally under UN auspices.  
There is a tendency right now in Greek academic circles to pretend that all that is needed 
for international conflicts to go away is to take a neo-liberal approach (a ‘win-win’ 
situation) and ignore the lessons of Machiavellian realism. It is only fair to add that this is 
an oversimplification of IR theory and one that tends to ignore its evolution over the 
past 100 years or so50. There is a strong traditional IR theory that claims that order and 
justice are possible but that there is no need for utopian idealism either. All this also 
ignores that the EU is actually militarising, a decision favoured by the Greek government. 
Equally, there was very little discussion about the emerging doctrine of ‘the right to 
interfere’ (what Bernard Kouchner has labelled ‘the responsibility to protect’51), which 
began after the end of the Cold War, well before the Bush administration (the current 
one) took the term to its exclusive use. Thus, it remains clear that ‘a law without a sword 
remains an empty threat’, to paraphrase Professor Yves Roucaute’s own words (‘le droit 
sans l’epee n’est qu’un mot et la morale sans volonte un songe creux’52).  
 
One should not assume either that what is good for the French (as defined by a Gaullist 
president in a Gaullist system with the support of an opposition that whilst in power was 
                                                 
48 William Pfaff, International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2003. 
49 see Ortega 2001. 
50 this is particularly visible in Keridis 2003, pp.1 and 12. 
51 Le Monde, 7 June 2002. 
52 Le Monde, 7 March 2003. 
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more Gaullist than de Gaulle) is necessarily good for all Europeans irrespective of their 
nationalities and other preferences. Thus, one should not rush to easy labels such as a 
‘European Europe’ versus an ‘American Europe’53. The real world is more complex than 
clichés. Also, subsequent events showed how even supposedly highly principled views 
could change over time54. Le Monde’s editorial piece dated 22 May 2003 put things into 
perspective: ‘Retour aux realites’. This part of the discussion also relates to the wider 
debate about the future of Europe and what kind of Europe we want: a real super power 
or a mere civilian presence55? It relates to the wider debate about intergovernmentalists 
versus federalists, and big versus small states56. Again, I do not enter here this debate. 
 
Europeanisation could mean ‘shorthand’ for European convergence. It is more than 
integration, but it still needs more work, both empirical and theoretical, to be define well 
enough to be extremely useful. If one adopts the same approach to economic and 
financial convergence models, and on the EMU model for instance, then it would be 
desirable to identify clear criteria for FP convergence. Whether such a possibility is 
feasible or at least as easily identifiable as the Maastricht criteria remains an open 
question. 
 
In short, how can one plausibly claim that Greek foreign policy has been Europeanised 
when over Iraq there was no common EU stance? But one needs to go beyond the mere 
claims that Europe has been built on crises and that therefore automatically there will 
progress after the one in Iraq. This fails to consider the seriousness and importance of 
this particular crisis and also, as importantly, that Iraq acted as a catalyst for a variety of 
difficulties and problems that the EU in general and the CFSP in particular had. That is 
to say those who pay are the ‘others’. To name but the most recent crises, Maastricht was 
agreed when the Balkans descended into chaos and war, NATO’s 40th Anniversary 
occurred during the Kosovo bombing. So, if the EU needs to agree on a strategic 
doctrine according to this approach, I simply pity the victims of dictators and dictatorial 
regimes in the world. To claim that a ‘regenerated Europe’ has come out of the crisis (the 
words used by the French ambassador in Athens), smacks of arrogance and a lack of 
                                                 
53 Arnaud Leparmentier’s ‘L’ Irak revele les factures de l’Europe’, Le Monde, 2-3 May 2003. 
54 see Pierre Lellouche, International Herald Tribune, 18.04.03. 
55 Stavridis 2001d. 
56 Chryssochoou et al., 2003, pp. 1-40; Stavridis 2002a. 
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sensitivity with all due respect to diplomats57. But diplomats, contrary to what is expected of 
academics, are known to ‘lie’ for their country when they deem it necessary58. 
 
As for viewing the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy as  a positive development, 
it is somehow surprising that so little was mentioned in the interviews about the pros and 
cons of each FP case, whether it was claimed that such a process had actually occurred. 
This may represent consensus in Greece but it does not reflect the strong differences 
over Europe that have existed in the past, especially between Left and Right, and within 
the Socialist Party (c.f. its evolution from a Third-Worldist, anti-European stance to a 
pro-EU party, at least at the elite level). What stems from the above is that one should 
not confuse the Europeanisation of PASOK and that of Greece unless when claims that 
as New Democracy was already pro-European, and as both parties represent over 80% 
of the Greek electorate (2000 election results), then Europeanisation has indeed 
occurred. Thus, here we have a difference between the conclusion of the process, and 
the continuation of a process, as we also need to differentiate between elites and mass 
opinion. Without entering in the details, it is important to stress the existence of a 
discrepancy between those views especially over the wars in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq 
(2003). One could expand this problematique to the issue of terrorism in general and ‘17 
November’ trials in particular (I leave this open but non scientific discussions I had in 
Greece show some worrying trends among mass opinion with many ordinary people 
arguing that although they disagreed with the means used, they fundamentally agreed 
with the terrorists’ objectives!). One should also add that there are some diverging voices 
within New Democracy which can of course conveniently be dismissed as ‘nationalistic’ 
but which could prove difficult to handle in the future (especially if there is New 
Democracy victory in the forthcoming elections) or if the Macedonian issue comes back 
with a revenge. Another divisive issue would be Cyprus/Tukey. Former defence minister 
Giannis Varvitsiotis made it clear that although he was not opposed to a rapprochement 
with Turkey, he could not see why Foreign Minister Papandreou had extended the 
informal Foreign Ministers Kastellorizo meeting to include a lunch session in Kas in 
Turkey59.  
 
                                                 
57 in an interview published [in Greek] in Kathimerini, 1 June 2003. 
58 A similar argument is put forward in Everts and Keohane (2003), pp183-184 under the title of 
‘School of failure’. I do not agree with this approach if only for moral reasons. 
59 “Diaxifismi”, MEGA TV, 5 May 2003. 
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As for anti-Americanism, several interviewees rejected it as a popular, populist 
argument but there was very little interest or explanation as to how the academics’ own 
views may affect this aspect of the wider debate in the Greek society. Thus, to name but 
one example here on the specific example of the 2003 Iraq war, and to leave the wider 
debate open, there was no reference to the theoretical debate in the IR (International 
Relations) literature on the ‘international system’ in light of the 11th September mega-
terrorist attacks, on ‘just war theory’, or on ’pre-emptive strikes’. To put it simply on the 
use of force in international relations (see also above). Nor on the need to reform the 
United Nations, and in particular its Security Council60 It is also interesting to note that 
the so-called ‘pro-EU’ French still refuse to see a single EU seat on the UN’s Security 
Council. Such a suggestion was unanimously rejected by all 5 French academics attending 
the 11th Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion University. The whole question of 
what anti-Americanism means is becoming more complex now that the so-called ‘new 
anti-Americans’ have been defined as ‘former anti-anti-Americans, now forced to 
become anti-American themselves’61. 
 
A side effect of Americanism or anti-Americanism has to do with internal Greek politics 
where the Right is traditionally seen to be more pro-American than the Left62. But even 
within the Right there are different levels of pro-Americanism. I do not enter this debate 
here but it will undoubtedly become more important in the near future (elections) and 
also because PM Simitis has been on record (in the Greek Parliament) to thank the US 
administration for its support just after the 1996 Imia crisis. Something that no one 
expects from a Right PM to do publicly. Similarly, it has been said that Simitis has asked 
the Americans (via US ambassador Thomas Miller in Athens) not to be thanked for 
Greece’s support of the Allied offensive in Iraq. All this amounts to the domestic sources 
of foreign policy and deserves more attention than was given in this study. 
 
One should add that conspiracy theories thrive in Greece. This is not limited to public 
opinion. Even serious academics (from an Athens-based university, but un-named here 
                                                 
60 in that respect see Glennon, 2003. 
61 William Pfaff, ‘Bush policy risks terminal strain in NATO’, International Herald Tribune, 21 July 
2003. See also Theodore Couloumbis, ‘Tackling anti-Americanism in Greece’, Kathimerini/English 
edition, 15 May 2003. 
62 see Le Monde, 23-24 March 2003, ‘En Grece, le conflit a ranime un puissant sentiment 
antiamericain’. See also Thanos Veremis, ‘Anti-Americanism’ [in Greek], Kathimerini, Sunday 13 
April 2003. See also Aris Tziampiris (forthcoming), The False Premise of Greek anti-Americanism, in 
particular his references to who was to blame for September 11th (about 25% the CIA and 7% Mossad). 
 23
for obvious reasons) informally ‘joked’ with me about the fact that there is no guarantee 
that Al Qaida were the real attackers on 11th September 2001. They argued there was no 
evidence and that there were no Jewish victims in these attacks. Besides the fact that 
there is plenty of evidence and that there were Jewish victims (in fact 54 nationalities 
were involved if my memory serves me right) and Le Monde has carried out an 
investigation in the initial allegations that came out of a Lebanese newspaper. The 
allegations were totally discredited but it appears not in Greece. A situation that is not 
dissimilar to the Arab media where conspiracy theories thrive (e.g. Saddam as a CIA 
agent currently in Florida). An additional fundamental problem with conspiracy theories 
is that if they are rarely proved, and the same conspiracy lovers then argue that it simply 
confirms such a big conspiracy cannot be proven! 
 
Another important underlying issue here is that of ideology and more particularly 
ideological bias: everything is the result of world capitalism and therefore some resistance 
must take place. Thus, on the campuses of two Athens universities with a ‘strong’ IR 
tradition (University of Athens and Panteion University), there were huge placards in 
support of Socialist Cuba with a picture of Che Guevara. It is interesting to note that EU 
policy on Cuba is one of the few areas where there is agreement among the 15 and it is 
not in support of Che’s or Fidel’s ideals63! One can of course dismiss this approach as 
non-representative but I use it here to give a picture of the wider context (atmospherics 
are important in politics). Similarly on the 2003 anniversary of the first man landing on 
the moon on 20 July 1969, Greek TV commemorated the event with pictures from that 
historic event but hastened to stress that there are some who believe it was a Hollywood-
engineered coup to upstage the Soviet Union who were the first to send a man into space 
in 1962. Needless to say we all know that the USSR did not engage into any 
propagandistic exercise and that of course only the Americans can stage such ‘world lies’. 
 
On the Greek Presidency (I only refer to foreign policy issues), one would like to claim 
that everything went fine and that contrary to past experiences, and in particular the 
Presidencies of 1983 and 1988, but also the one in 1994 (mainly over the FYROM 
embargo), the 2003 Greek Presidency went well. There were plenty of congratulatory 
comments in the media from a number of political leaders. Thus, Simitis claimed it was a 
                                                 
63 see Kathimerini [in Greek], 28 August 2003. 
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success64. So did several of his ministers, for instance Finance Minister Nikos 
Christodoulakis65. Foreign Minister Papandreou even threw a celebratory party in his 
family house of Kastri on 16.7.03. In his words, it had been ‘a difficult but beautiful 
Presidency’66. He also appeared in an interview in one of the leading Sunday newspapers 
the following Sunday where he claimed there was no attempt on his part to succeed to 
the current PM67. Many commentators agreed68. In fact, during the June European 
Council meeting, to use words from Le Monde, most of the Greek press played a 
‘patriotic fibre’69. In Greece, even those critical of the government for party political 
reasons accepted that the Presidency had been successful, but some before attacking the 
government on its internal performance70. So did 80% of Greek public opinion71. Even 
EU officials –admittedly Greeks- in Greece went as far as to claim that the Presidency 
had ‘successfully bridged the gap between Euro-American relations’72. Perhaps the 
climate created by so many academics did not help for a more accurate and realistic 
assessment. 
 
Foreign observers or practitioners agreed as well: European Popular Party leader Hans-
Gert Poettering for instance: ‘your success is our success too’73. Foreign leaders also were 
at hand in that respect. During Simitis’ end of Presidency tour of EU capitals (prior to 
the Salonica/Halkidiki European Council meeting of 20-21 June 2003), when he was in 
Paris, French President Jacques Chirac declared that: 
‘I took the opportunity to express to the Greek prime minister the appreciation 
we feel for the masterly way in which the Greek presidency handled EU issues 
through its presidency. I am sure this is a superb presidency’74. 
 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder praised Athens for its ‘first-class’ handling of the 
Presidency when Simitis visited Berlin75. There were plenty more ‘flowers’ from foreign 
officials, especially when one saw how well the Italian Presidency began with the 
                                                 
64 Kathimerini/English edition, 1 July 2003. 
65 www.in.gr/news, 5 March 2003. 
66 Greek TV news reports on that day. 
67 To Vima Tys Kyriakis, 20 July 2003. 
68 see Giannis Kartalis on ‘the new role of Greece’, in To Vima, 20 April 2003 [in Greek]. 
69 25 June 2003. 
70 see Stavros Lygeros, ‘One step back, two forward’, Kathimerini/English edition, 23 May 2003. 
71 www.in.gr/news, based on a ‘Metron Analysis’ survey, 5 May 2003. 
72 George Markopouliotis (Head of European Commission in Athens) interview, Kathimerini tys 
Kyriakis [in Greek], 21.09.03. 
73 Kathimerini/English edition, 2 July 2003. 
74 Kathimerini/English edition, 7-8 June 2003. 
75 Kathimerini/English edition, 14-15 June 2003. 
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Berlusconi outburst against the Germans in the EP plenary in early July. The Greek press 
also dedicated space to the positive reports made in the international media76. 
 
There were only isolated critical views, mainly for sympathisers of the Greek Opposition 
parties. No academic criticism was expressed as far as I know. For an isolated journalistic 
approach that went against the grain, see Nikos Konstandaras, ‘Hopelessly devoted to 
EU’77. Konstandaras also wonders if: 
‘there is such unanimity in the way that the war is seen that it is impossible to 
know whether this is the result of the one-dimensional view of the news media or 
whether the media do not dare to challenge the monolith of public opinion and 
therefore pander to it’.  
 
I would like to point out the title of this other article of his: ‘Owners of the truth’78. 
 
The same view was widely shared by the interviewees (see above), although some did 
refer to the intrinsic limitations of the Presidency and of a small(er) state in particular. I 
do not want to be the one ‘spoiling the party’ as it were, but I am rather amazed at the 
lack of serious academic analysis on the subject besides the self-congratulatory opinions. 
This is particularly so when some observers outside Greece did not hesitate to make 
snoopy comments at the Greek presidency. See for instance ‘the Greek Presidency was 
sidelined’ in the Institute for Security Studies’ Institute Note of 17 March 2003 from a 
meeting on ‘CFSP confronting Iraq’ held in Paris on 3 March 200379. Professor Esther 
Barbe expressed a similar viewpoint in her introductory comments to the ‘Special Iraq’ 
dossier mentioned above80. Similarly, very little attention was given to the fact that the 
Greek Prime Minister was informed about the ‘Letter of the Eight’ not by Tony Blair or 
Silvio Berlusconi with whom he had phone conversations on the eve of its publication, 
but by Hungarian Premier Peter Medgyessy who happened to be in Athens on an 
official visit. This is just one example to add it to a number of more dismissive 
approaches to the ‘success’ of the Greek Presidency. It must also be contrasted to the 
flattering comments in the media, politicians and other commentators in Greece, because 
it shows that a credibility gap is difficult to close for a country with a relatively bad 
reputation as a European partner, if only one side (Greece) believes it has moved away 
                                                 
76 see [in Greek] To Vima tys Kyriakis, 3 August 2003. 
77 Kathimerini/English edition, 31 May-1 June 2003. 
78 Kathimerini/English edition, 5-6 April 2003. 
79 www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep03.1e.pdf as printed on 2.5.03. 
80 ‘(…) pone en entredicho la maquineria institucional (presidencia griega, mecanismos PESC)’, Esther 
Barbe, Irak y el club europeo ? cual de ellos, http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/catala/obs, February 2003. 
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from such a past (now described as a full EU member by its PM) whilst the other 
partners have decided not to do so, intentionally or not. I do not develop this dimension 
at all in the current work but it deserves further attention all the same. 
 
Indeed, listening to/reading reports in the media and elsewhere (I refer to those made by 
Greek academics), one could forget that, to use someone else’s words, mainly over Iraq, 
the unity of Europe was torn to pieces81. Where does this leave the Greek Presidency? It 
is often forgotten that PM Simitis had claimed that one of the key objectives of the 
Presidency would be to keep the EU united and to avoid a war in Iraq. Only a fool (et je 
pese mes mots) could argue that either objective was achieved. Thus, for domestic reasons, 
a government is sometimes ‘obliged’ to push for a foreign policy card in order to divert 
attention from other domestic problems. Such a situation was clearly visible in May 2003 
in Greece where opinion poll after opinion poll put the Opposition Party (New 
Democracy) in the lead over the ruling Socialist government (PASOK). In response, 
Simitis called on everyone to concentrate on the Presidency for the time being. Political 
scandals did not help the situation, nor did mass redundancies. What is important is that 
such a tense (pre-electoral) situation (elections are due by April 2004) means that 
bipartisan divergences appear on almost all assessments of international events. The fact 
that early 2003 was particularly difficult due to the war in Iraq and its consequences mean 
that the issue of the Presidency had become more and more an alibi for the 
government’s action, that is to say, until the end of the Presidency on 31 July 2003. 
Therefore even when one reads carefully the official Greek foreign ministry assessment 
on the Presidency’s achievements, it is not easy to find somewhat unrealistic the claims 
made in it, or the comments attached to them82. 
 
To be complete one should also add that more often than not a coincidence of deadlines 
and dates makes some Presidencies appear more ‘successful’ than others but 
independent-minded experts should not be fooled by this aspect of the question (the 
coincidence of the Greek Presidency with the enlargement signing ceremony in April in 
Athens and the formal end to the Convention work in Salonica in June). I reckon that 
the self-congratulatory nature of the various declarations made by the current 
                                                 
81 (“L’ unite de l’Europe en lambeaux”, Laurent Zecchini, Le Monde, 1 February 2003. 
82 See for instance pages 2 and 6 (Iraq). Results of the 2003 Greek Presidency by Policy Area: A 
scoreboard (Greek Foreign Ministry, July 2003, on Presidency website). On a lighter note, I have 
included a number of political cartoons at the end of this work (see Annex 4), one of them refers to this 
particular period. 
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government is rather unconvincing when the EU experienced one of its most divisive 
crises ever. It is also common knowledge that all presidencies claim that they live in ‘one 
of the most challenging six-months periods in the history of the EU’83.  
 
Also, as if often the case, it is no coincidence that there is a plethora of articles praising 
the Presidency, mainly from government supporters, declared or not. For instance, 
PASOK MEP (and academic professor of constitutional law) Dimitris Tsatsos described 
Greece’s role in the Presidency as ‘historic’. What is surprising is not only the date (less 
than two months in the Presidency) of the article but the fact that a few days later the 
EU was gong to go through one of its deepest crisis over Iraq, unlike Professor Tsatsos’ 
claim to the contrary (Ta Nea, 19 February 2003 [in Greek]). 
 
It is also no coincidence that the PM did not handle very well the press conference in 
Brussels after the extraordinary European Council (for details see the Aggelopoulos 
article [in Greek] in Kathimerini, Sunday edition, 23 March 2003). Nor is it a coincidence 
that his end of Presidency speech in Strasbourg refers to Iraq as ‘the most difficult 
chapter of our Presidency’. His other comments on the same question are vague and 
general and simply do not reflect the reality of the deep divisions that this episode 
generated for the EU84. 
 
A final point on the Greek Presidency and its handling of the Iraq situation must be 
made, however briefly. The question of the discrepancy between governments’ views 
and those of public opinions in the case of Iraq in 2003 has led to some discussion on 
the subject. But it has been rather journalistic in style. Even academic experts, appearing 
on the numerous programmes that could be seen on Greek TV stations during the war, 
did not offer any serious explanations as to the reasons of such a phenomenon. Greek 
analysts conveniently hid behind the fact that Greek public opinion was in tune with that 
of the rhetoric put forward by the Government: 91% were against the war. The 
equivalent number was 95% against the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo. Thus, some 
easy self-congratulatory comments referred to the ‘consistency’ of Greek public opinion 
and on how in their view other EU national public opinions had ‘converged’ with that in 
Greece. No one seriously wondered why Greece was the exception in 1999, or what the 
                                                 
83 Friis, 2002, p.7. 
84 www.eu2003.gr , 1.7.03 as printed on 2.7.03. 
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implications of the current (2003) situation means for the future of Europe. Is it a 
democratic disjunction that will have long-term implications? Again, even if they fall 
beyond the scope of the current study, these are questions that need further and more 
systematic analysis. 
 
There was a barrage of TV programmes on a number of channels, most of them of 
dubious quality. Exceptions included two channels: NET and MEGA (in the latter, 
Alexis Papahelas was particularly good in his work). Others, like ALTER, deserve a 
special price for misinformation (or is it disinformation?). According to most of these 
reports, the US forces were bogged down, and Iraqis were resisting ‘heroically’. The 
overall quality of the Greek media is rather saddening (this is based on my own –
admittedly anecdotal, but still lengthy - experience of French, British, Spanish and Italian, 
as well as Greek, TV programmes over the past few decades). I must add that other 
countries do not fall far behind either85. This approach puts the Greek case in a less 
critical viewpoint but it confirms that most debates were of a poor quality. This is a 
question that deserves attention at the time when mass communications (mass education, 
etc.) allow for easier and better access to information as never before.  
 
As for the particular aspect of the question of Europeanisation, or rather its absence in 
the media, or in the general level of knowledge among society at large, despite being 
mentioned as problematic by several interviewees (Botsiou, Keridis, Perrakis), there 
seemed to be no real linkage with the role of academics in that respect. Be it through 
their purely academic work or through their vulgarisation in the media (as noted above a 
very common exercise for all Greek academics based in Greece nowadays). My own 
experience on a daily basis is that Greek society is extremely politicised and discusses at 
length international issues but with very little depth and plenty of unsophisticated biases. 
 
Thus, when a seasoned observer complained about the lack of accuracy about the French 
case as presented on the US media (and in particular TV), I can but only point to those 
who want to access information to do a better job rather than blame governments for 
not allowing access to that information. In this particular case Professor Stanley 
Hoffmann was complaining that the US administration did not allow for a fair 
                                                 
85 For a general critique of the poor quality of most debates about Iraq, see Annie Cohen-Solal, ‘France 
- Etats-Unis: un clivage depassable’, Le Monde, 9.5.03. 
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representation of the French case86. All that was needed was for the American public to 
access the internet and get the required ‘raw material’ (which incidentally is also available 
in English) from the French government website or listen to President Chirac’s live 
interview on TV5 on the eve of the US-led attack on Iraq. One should also wonder if 
any Greek university would have invited an American academic who was not highly 
critical of the war. Thus, prominent place was given to Kiesling, Hoffmann, Chomsky, 
and even Johnny Depp87 (also anti-Blair Labour MPs). One wonders how much 
objectivity there was in such a selective approach. 
 
What Hoffmann was right to remind us about is that governments often blame the lack 
of public interest for justifying their exclusive prerogatives in foreign policy, when in fact 
they nurture such a situation. See British MP Ponsonby for a (nearly) century-old 
accurate criticism of this situation: ‘the people’s opinion on foreign questions is 
discounted because of their ignorance – an ignorance for which the Government itself is 
largely responsible’88. One should add that there were no radio, TV or internet at the time 
(yes: almost a century ago) Ponsonby was writing, so today the blame should be shared 
more equally between those who govern and those who are governed. 
 
The question remains: is this an effect of Europeanisation, or can we safely blame the 
Americans (a traditional and annoying  passe-temps in Greece)? To be fair on Greek public 
opinion, one should also add that about a third of the French polled during the war in 
Iraq said that they were wishing for an Iraqi victory (various press reports during that 
period). As for the Germans (aged under 30), almost one in three of them believed in 
2003 that the 9/11 attack may have been sponsored by the USA89. 
 
Finally, a few more points about public opinion and how it perceives Europeanisation 
(this refers to the wider political and policy context and not only to FP): If 
Europeanisation means democratization and modernization (both economic and 
political), and if it is at the same time claimed that Europeanisation has indeed occurred 
                                                 
86 7 May 2003 Athens at a lecture organised by the Kokkalis Foundation and the Hellenic-American 
Union. 
87 on the American actor see [in Greek] ‘VimaMagazino’ in To Vima Tys Kyriakis, 17 August 2003 and 
on the US diplomat based in Athens who resigned over Bush’s policy, see a full interview in To Vima 
Tys Kyriakis, 17 August 2003. Symbolically, Prof Hoffmann thanked publicly Mr Kiesling for his 
stance during his lecture in Athens. Kiesling was in the audience. 
88 Ponsonby, 1915, pp 28-29. 
89 according to a poll in Die Zeit as reported in International Herald Tribune, 24 July 2003. 
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in Greece, then how come that there is so little trust in a Europeanised Greece? As I 
mentioned above, these are questions I will not develop here but they deserve further 
attention in the future. What remains clear is that ‘Europe’ continues to be seen as a 
panacea for all problems in Greece. Other similar questions would be how to reconcile 
the fact that it is now argued that in part thanks to Europeanisation, personalities are no 
longer as important in Greek FP as in the past, and then give credit to PM Simitis 
himself for such a change90. Is this simply a perception because it has been repeated 
often enough or is it a correct reflection of a new reality? Most recently by Greek 
Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou who described the Greek PM as a ‘northern 
European’ because he sets out clear objectives and then carries out the necessary policies 
to achieve them91. Similarly, The Economist described George Papandreou when he first 
became foreign minister as ‘flouting Greek tradition’ because ‘he is less prickly with 
foreigners than are most Greek Socialists’92, mentioning his life abroad and in particular 
his teenager years in Canada and in Sweden (1 May 1999). 
 
Thus, it is said that: 
‘[t]he high level of Greek public trust in EU institutions reflects to a significant 
degree the low trust in the national civil service (…), and the low degree of 
overall satisfaction with the functioning of national democracy’93. 
 
Similarly, a recent poll suggests that: 
‘most Greeks are sceptical of the government (53%) while eight out of 10 do not 
trust political parties and half do not trust the news media (…) Greeks are more 
distrustful of their democratic system (80 percent) than of multinational 
corporation’94. 
 
These phenomena deserve further and more systematic investigation. Without entering 
in any detail here, I mention some contradictions in a number of opinion polls. Some of 
them concern the question of the methodology used, especially with respect to the type 
of questions asked. Eurobarometer is especially ‘guilty’ in that respect because it tends to 
ask either questions that no one could really be opposed to, because they are too vague 
or general, e.g., ‘are you in favour of more Europe?’95. These remind us of questions such 
                                                 
90 Ioakimidis 2000. 
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as are you in favour of peace, love and equality. As I have mentioned elsewhere96, as 
soon as a third option (to a EU or a national options) is made available (the third allows 
for a combination of an EU and a national response), then overwhelming support for an 
EU defence or foreign policy falls back to about a third of responses. The other two 
possibilities (the national response and the EU alone response) obtain again about a third 
each. Thus, when a more sophisticated approach is used, the results look much more 
close to an accurate reflection of reality: i.e. the world is more complex and also these 
three options are actually happening in the EU according to issue-areas and countries 
involved. Therefore, work that uses results based on poorly devised or even guided 
questioning can only be seen as problematic97. 
 
Similarly, it is ironic that so many interviewees claimed that personalities matter much 
less nowadays as further evidence of Europeanisation, and then stressed the vital role 
played in that process by specific individuals (almost all interviewees, see also Keridis 
2003, pp. 8 and 10). I do not dispute the role of elites but simply note that if the elite 
level is the only one that has become Europeanised, how is it possible to claim the 
process has been completed and cannot possibly be reversed? Equally, if Greek foreign 
policy has indeed become Europeanised how come traditional ethnika themata continue to 
dominate Greek FP? As it was illustrated by the recent (end of August 2003) meeting 
between PM Simitis and FM Papandreou: Greek-Turkish relations (including Turkey’s 
EU membership prospects), the European Convention, and the Cyprus Issue topped 
their agenda (Kathimerini [in Greek], 28 August 2003). Perhaps a change of style but not 
of substance. Again, my point here that there is some Europeanisation but that the 
process has not finalised yet. 
 
 
3. Conclusions and recommendations for future research 
 
To a large extent this work is a pilot-study because, despite the existence of an extensive 
literature on Europeanisation in Greece in general and in Greek foreign policy in 
particular, there is still a lot of work to be done not only with respect to particular 
empirical cases but also in terms of comparative foreign policy work. What follows 
                                                                                                                                            
‘more Europe’ but conveniently ignore that one of the key questions for European integration is what 
kind of Europe is wanted. 
96 Stavridis 1997a: 139-140 and Stavridis 2001b: 299. 
97 for instance Pagoulatos 2002: 23-24; other recent examples include Seabra 1998; Mestres 2002. 
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covers both the findings of the study (Conclusions) and a proposed test for the future 
assessment of whether specific issue-areas of national foreign policy have become 
Europeanised (the ‘pendulum test’). 
 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion is that Greek foreign policy has come a long way from the time it 
was described as disruptive, non-European (even anti-European), or the ‘black sheep’ of 
Europe.98 This viewpoint was based on Greece’s alleged record in EPC. I will not enter 
here the wider debate about whether such an assessment was totally correct99, but suffice 
it to say that Greece’s international image and reputation were rather tarnished. Such a 
negative assessment still occurred until the early 1990s100. For instance, in the summer of 
1992, The Spectator’s front page showed a Parthenon with barbed wires and guards towers 
a-la-concentration camps and an article entitled ‘I fear the Greeks’, sub-titled ‘how 
Greece’s profound neurosis about its own identity is the biggest single impediment to 
any sensible EEC policy in the region’101. In contrast, the November 2002 issue of Greece-
Background/News/Information (published by the Greek embassy in London) stressed that 
The Economist had recently produced a survey on Greece in which it said that ‘all of a 
sudden the naughtiest pupil in the class is getting top marks’102.  
 
In brief, ‘EOK-NATO idio syndikato [EEC-NATO –same club]”, is a well forgotten 
slogan nowadays103. For instance, it would not be possible nowadays to adopt Greece’s 
PM (at that time) claim that: 
‘we remain unshaken in our position with regard to proposing a special 
agreement with the European communities which will allow the application of 
our development programme (…) and will safeguard our national independence. 
The government (…) will honour the decision of the Greek people, whatever it 
may be, when it is expressed. In any event, until the Greek people decide, we
shall give battle within the organs of the European Communities to defend the 
interests of the Greek people’
 
                                                
104.  
 
98 Significantly, when Spain joined in 1986, the fear was that it would become a ‘second Greece’, 
Barbe, 1996. 
99 See Stavridis and Pruett, 1996. 
100 For details, see Ioakimidis (1995) where he refers to the way The Economist used to brand Greece in 
the 1980s as the sick man or the black sheep of Europe. A former foreign minister and current MP now 
uses the term ‘black sheep’ for Britain, ‘VimaMagazino’, To Vima, [in Greek] Sunday 30 March 2003. 
101 15 August 1992. For more along the same lines, see Featherstone, 1996, p.4. 
102 p.2. 
103 For more details see Huliaras (1989). 
104 The Greek government programme on foreign policy as presented by the PM Papandreou in 1981 in 
the Greek Parliament, Hellenic Review of International Relations, Volumes 3-4, 1983-1984, pages 664-
667. The quote is from page 666, emphasis added. 
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 According to Botsiou (interview), there are numerous past quotes in the same vein by 
various political leaders, including some made by Simitis himself during the late 1970s. 
 
What remains problematic however is whether a positive assessment of Europeanisation 
in Greek FP is not too optimistic and resides on shaky grounds, as the process appears at 
best to be superficial. The real test of Europeanisation must also include the whole of 
Greek public policy and society and not just academic elites and its foreign policy. 
 
The second conclusion is that further research is needed because so far emphasis has 
been given to the ‘domestic impact of Europeanisation’ but not to the dynamic effect 
of this process. Therefore there are at least two further areas for future research. The 
first refers to a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of Greek foreign policy, 
because at the end of the day the citizens and not experts would be the best judge on 
whether Europeanisation has successfully occurred or not. It could build on the current 
work and also refer to the vast literature on the subject in Greek (for obvious time 
limitations, I have preferred to concentrate on the existing writings in English and 
supplement them with interviews). For instance, the impact of Europeanisation of Greek 
FP on political parties, public opinion or the Vouli (Greek Parliament) would be of 
particular interest. There is already a conference proposed for early next year that will 
develop this aspect of the question105. This approach would develop the empirical 
dimension of research on Europeanisation. An additional effort to then compare various 
Europeanised national foreign policies would also be needed. As for the second area of 
future research, it concerns the theoretical question of what Europeanisation actually 
means. From the literature, but equally from the interviews, there was a lot of confusion 
and slippage (for instance to concepts such as democratisation, modernisation, 
‘regionalisation’, ‘EUisation’106or even globalisation). More academic research on the 
concept of ‘Europeanisation’ itself is therefore needed.  
 
This is therefore an important conclusion of this study: Europeanisation appears to be a 
two-way process. The Europeanisation of a national foreign policy is only half of the 
story. ‘Internalizing’ (to use Ioakimidis’ expression) is a necessary process but not a 
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106 See for instance in the field of education, Field (2002). 
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sufficient one. ‘Externalizing’, or perhaps even better ‘EUizing’, national interests to the 
EU level appears to be as important. Although it is admittedly much more problematic 
to achieve, especially when there is an opposing view already taken (for whatever reason) 
by other EU governments or institutions (especially the Commission over the Greek 
embargo on FYROM in 1994107). Of the EU institutions, the EP appears a priori as more 
open to change in particular with regard to human rights questions108. 
 
What remains clear is the need for the EU to have and apply clearly defined principles in 
its foreign policy. In other words, principles in EU FP are not a luxury but a necessity, to 
use Professor Hill’s words109 in 1991. Such a conclusion also confirms that institutions 
however useful are not enough110. There is a need for political will and direction. 
Europeanisation as a process can be useful in defining these EU principles. Otherwise 
double and multiple standards will prevail and reinforce further the anarchical nature of 
the international system. 
 
Another, more theoretical, question that I have not addressed is whether 
Europeanisation  (however defined) is more effective before accession. That is to say 
that because of the length and depth of European integration since the early 1950s, any 
candidate state needs to make a real change in its political system, institutions, etc well 
before it joins. Thus, Montenegro (of Serbia and Montenegro) has just announced it is 
establishing an Ombudsman office by a parliamentary vote111. The role of the 
Ombudsman (in fact in plural) is now well established in the EU. In Greece, its first 
Ombudsman (Prof Diamandouros) has now become the second EU Ombudsman, a 
development well praised in Greece as another sign of its Europeanisation. 
 
One also needs to consider whether EU enlargement will make the process of 
Europeanisation all the more complex and difficult. As was witnessed during the Iraq 
war in 2003, some states backed one option and others another. Some observers claim 
that for the new member states it is just a question of time and their national foreign 
policies will become Europeanised in due course112. 
                                                 
107 see Stavridis 1997a. 
108 On the EP and the Western Sahara question, see Urruela 1995. 
109 Hill, 1991. 
110 Stavridis 1997b. 
111 Kathimerini/English edition, 9 July 2003. 
112 what Tsoukalis calls the ‘optimistic’ view of enlargement, Kathimerini, 26-27.4.03. 
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 The ‘pendulum test’ 
The ‘pendulum test’ model is rather simple, and hopefully not too simplistic. It draws a 
medium line between the two original (initial), usually extreme (but at least widely 
different), positions on a given FP issue, of on the one hand Greece and on the other the 
remaining EU states (often supported by the Commission and the EP). It spells out the 
differences of opinions in the past and then tries to consider these differences as they 
might appear nowadays. It then assesses if there has been a coming together of the two 
positions. To do so, it tries to assess if this ‘rapprochement’ is the result of a 
Europeanisation process defined here as the need to use ‘Europe’ (read the EU) to try 
and achieve a national foreign policy goal, or, perhaps more interestingly, if the other EU 
states have come closer to the initial Greek position. It is important to note that I do not 
think one should enter too much in the merits of each case. The question becomes ‘has 
the pendulum shifted’? If so, in what direction? For what reasons? 
 
In order to carry out this research, one would interview practitioners and academics from 
the other 14 EU member states and assess how they react to this kind of research in 
general and this set of empirical cases in particular113. To complete this dimension, one 
should also extend it to include officials from EU institutions, including perhaps most 
importantly, MEPs. Such a ‘mirror’ interviewing process on the same case studies as 
analysed in this study would indeed be extremely useful. But such an exercise would 
require undoubtedly more time and effort than a shorter research project like the current 
one could possibly afford. Finally, to offer a complete comparative dimension one would 
need to carry out similar exercises in the national foreign policies of other EU member 
states. This double-sided approach (impact on Greece plus impact on the rest of the EU) 
would go one step beyond the current literature, which has so far concentrated on the 
domestic impact of Europeanisation but has ignored its dynamic effect. 
 
Such an approach would also build on the use of ‘controversial’ FP issues (Ballesteros 
1998 as reported in Vaquer 2003). The existing literature on the ‘Europeanisation of 
foreign policies’ nowadays is increasingly using such an approach. This can be seen in a 
recent academic Workshop in June 2002 at LSE. Paper presentations concentrated on a 
                                                 
113 Such an approach could build on the EKEME (2002) poll of non-Greek EU elites’ views on 
Greece’s first 20 years of membership. 
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number of difficult foreign policy areas for EU members and applicant states: the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe for Germany, Asia for France, Zimbabwe for 
Britain, Morocco for Spain and Polish-German relations for Poland (all 2002 papers by 
Alister Miskimmon, Reuben Wong, Paul Williams, Jordi Vaquer, Marcin Zaborowski 
respectively). A similar direction can be found in another recent academic conference 
with papers on the EU and the Western Sahara, and the European dimension of Greek-
Turkish rapprochement (during the 2003 Edinburgh ECPR Joint Research Session. 
Papers by Jordi Vaquer and Gilles Bertrand respectively114). Another recent individual 
case refers to the UK and Somaliland (Huliaras 2002: 171). Another interesting case-
study, this time to do with Portugal, would be East Timor, especially if carried out in a 
diachronic manner just to show how Portugal’s preoccupation with that problem only 
emerged as a crucial international, and EU, issue at the end of the 1990s and the early 
2000s. A visualization of the ‘pendulum test’ model would look as follows: 
 
 
‘extreme’ Greek position     ‘extreme’ EU position 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
As for the EP becoming closer and closer to the Greek stance on Cyprus, it also 
confirms a Europeanisation of an EU institution. Thus a long way from the time Greece 
was seen as the ‘black sheep’ of Europe. But that does not mean in my view whether its 
foreign policy has become Europeanised or if it is a way (a means) to achieve traditional 
FP objectives. The difference of approach here can be summed up as the one between 
‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ (most interviewees claim the latter but at least two, not surprisingly 
IR experts, claim the former: Profs Ifestos and Ifantis). I leave this question open for 
future research. 
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Another question worth investigating in the future is that of the Ethniko Symvoulio 
(National Council) on Foreign Affairs which has now begun to function its first informal 
meeting took place on 30 August 2003115, following a constitutional amendment package 
in 2001. Is this further evidence of Europeanisation of Greek FP? A new trend appears 
to be emerging in a number of European countries in this direction. The need to obtain 
as wide a consensus as possible is not only desirable but also necessary from a 
democratic theory perspective. Perhaps this new interest in wider consultation about FP 
issues could develop in a Europeanisation of foreign policy making processes116. 
 
Another specific concern for Greece has to do with its educational system. The question 
of how to make the Greek education work better has been a constant headache for all 
Greek governments. It is a general problem that affects the whole education system and 
not just its university sector. It falls beyond the scope of this work but further study is 
needed in general and also in particular about the link between academia and politics. It 
remains clear (and interviews confirmed this particular point) that a reform is needed for 
the university sector in Greece117. It is no coincidence that several interviewees 
concurred: only 5% of students are really worth any effort at all, as the other 95% do not 
count. Another common complain was about the lack of real academic research in 
Greece (resources, output, quality). In brief, many noted that a systemic change is 
required to make Greek universities work properly. Otherwise, as Tsoukalis has noted118, 
Greece will continue to prefer to live on in its university education ‘mizeria’ or something 
like misery or miserable state of affairs as a good translation of a bad situation. What 
matters here is that there can be no Europeanisation of a country without an adequate 
education system. 
 
In terms of geographical areas, the Middle East appears as one important area of 
particular interest for Greek foreign policy that has not been given enough attention in 
                                                 
115 as reported in Kathimerini/English edition, 31 July 2003. 
116 for Spain, see the National Security Council (El Pais, 14.02.03) for an institutional mechanism, and 
current Opposition leader promises to meet with opposition leaders on foreign issues if he becomes PM 
(Zapatero se reunira cada 6 meses con el jefe de la oposicion si llega a la Moncloa’, El Pais, 25.01.03. 
117 For a stinging, but accurate, attack on the current university system see Professor Tsoukalis 
excellent piece in Kathimerini [in Greek], 8 September 2002. His main criticism being the lack of 
efficiency of the current system which ‘produce’ eventually (as Greece suffers from the ‘permanent 
student’ syndrome) poor graduates that only a clientelistic state (as the rest of the society) can really 
accommodate. See also ‘Education reform needed’, Kathimerini/English edition, 15.09.03. For more 
criticisms, see N. Vagena in To Vima, 18.04.99. 
118 Ibid. 
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my own view. I refer to the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards the Middle 
East, and the Palestinian issue in particular. Historic reasons do play a role but also the 
fact remains that the Greek position has traditionally been more pro-Arab and more pro-
Palestinian than the rest of EC/EU governments. Indeed, in the early 1980s the Socialist 
government of Andreas Papandreou recognised the PLO and granted it diplomatic status 
in Athens119 (with Israel there was no official, i.e. de jure, relations until 1990, under a New 
Democracy government, and a full nine years after joining the then EC. Greece was the 
last EU state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, unlike Spain that established 
them when it first joined the then EC in 1986). Thus, Greece took a pioneering stance on 
the Palestinian issue. Even if the EC/EU ‘bottom-line’ had been agreed in Venice in 
1980 (prior to Greek accession). In practice, many a EU government backed the US 
position (Camp David 1979) or tried its own national unilateral initiatives (France 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s). This aspect of the question is also related to wider 
issues of the Middle East and beyond, most notably the Iraq issue (again mainly France 
just days before the launch of the air offensive in January 1991 and again in early 2003 
this time in the UN Security Council). 
 
In terms of institutional and other changes within Greece as a result of the 
Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. Particular attention should be given to Greek 
public opinion. There is still a huge discrepancy between Greek public opinion and those 
in other EU states, mainly to do with Greece’s deep anti-Americanism. An interesting 
aspect of the question would be the increase in anti-US feelings (what appears like a 
worldwide phenomenon in recent months). Pro-Europeanism and anti-Americanism 
should not be misunderstood for one and the same thing. More research is needed and in 
particular about the role of university and other education institutions in the country. I 
do not expand on this question here but only list a number of recent polls findings that 
                                                 
119 ‘We recognize the PLO. There has been a change of status. As you know, there is an office, a 
bureau of the PLO in Athens already. What we intend to do is to raise its status to a diplomatic mission. 
And I think that maybe I should state our reasoning on this. That terrible problem of the Middle East 
has not been faced properly up to now. Our position is that, just as Israel has the right to its own state 
so does the people of Palestine. They do have a right to a state of their own. And until that is 
understood and until that takes place, there will be no peace in the Middle East’  (A. Papandreou 
interview with ABC TV on 25 October 1981, as reproduced in Hellenic Review of International 
Relations (Volumes 3-4,1983-1984), pp 668-673, quote on page 672. It is also interesting to note that 
this is more or less the current US position as expressed by President Bush in June 2002 and confirmed 
in the 2003 “Road Map”. One possible conclusion might be that once there is also agreement between 
the Americans and the Europeans (once the latter have achieved consensus among themselves), a given 
policy becomes possible and effective. The question then arises: is Europeanisation enough or does one 
need the US on board as well? I leave this question open for further study. 
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confirm Greece’s intrinsic anti-Americanism. I repeat how disturbing it is for a 
democracy to see such a discrepancy between the public view and that of the elites. 
 
Metron Analysis survey (as reported in Kathimerini/English edition, 5-6 April 2003) 
94.1% of Greeks against the war in Iraq (2003) 
77.5% negative view of USA (5.4% favourable) 
67.9% in favour of EU with 55.6% wanting political unification120. 
 
MGW ALCO survey on war (Kathimerini/English edition, 16 April 2003) 
89% unjust and illegal intervention 
3.8% just/legal 
7.2% do not know. 
 
What remains problematic for the future of Greek foreign policy is the fact that, as noted 
in the introduction, PM Simitis consistently played the EU card especially over Iraq, 
whereas Foreign Minister George Papandreou acted as a bridge with the USA, and (then) 
Socialist Party (PASOK) Secretary General Costas Laliotis led many an anti-war rally in 
the centre of Athens. Can this double or even triple language be considered to represent 
the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy? What, in my view more importantly, are 
the implications of such a situation for the democratic accountability of Greek foreign 
policy? 
 
  
This concludes what I hope was a useful and interesting study. I very much hope there 
will be more to come on this important subject for Greek foreign policy, international 
relations, and EU studies. Finally I would like to formally thank the Onassis Foundation, 
EKEM, and all the interviewees, and in particular Professor Ioakimidis, for their support 
and insight. Without their help this work would not have been possible. Of course, the 
usual proviso about responsibility applies here too. It is hoped that the current study has 
added to our knowledge and understanding of what Europeanisation in Greek foreign 
policy actually means, and that it has also identified a number of useful avenues for 
future research. 
  
APPENDIX 1 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS (chronological order): 
 
                                                 
120 see also Kathimerini/English edition, 10 April 2003. 
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• 28 May 2003: Dr Dimitris KERIDIS 
• 3 June: Dr Konstantina BOTSIOU  
• 11 June: Prof Panayotis IFESTOS 
• 12 June: Prof Panos TSAKALOYANNIS 
• 13 June: Prof Kostas IFANTIS 
• 17 June: Prof Theodore COULOUMBIS 
• 18 June: Prof Andreas MOSCHONAS 
• 20 June: Dr Dimitris CHRYSSOCHOOU 
• 25 June: Dr Charalambos TSARDANIDIS 
• 10 July: Dr Fotini BELLOU 
• 11 July: Dr Aris TZIAMPIRIS 
• 16 July: Prof Asteris HULIARAS 
• 5 September: Prof Stelios PERRAKIS 
• Prof Panayotis IOAKIMIDIS (March to September 2003) 
 
Interviewees (alphabetical order): 
 
• Dr Fotini BELLOU, Researcher, ELIAMEP. 
• Dr Konstantina BOTSIOU, Researcher, Constantine Caramanlis Foundation, 
and Lecturer in European History, University of Athens. 
• Dr Dimitris CHRYSSOCHOOU, (on leave) Reader in European Integration, 
University of Exeter, and Director of Studies, IAA Athens (Institute for Defense 
Analyses). 
• Prof Theodore COULOUMBIS, Emeritus Professor of International 
Relations, University of Athens, and General Director, ELIAMEP. 
• Dr Asteris HULIARAS Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, 
Harokopion University, Athens. 
• Prof Kostas IFANTIS, Associate Professor of International Relations, 
University of Athens. 
• Prof Panayotis IFESTOS, Professor of International Relations, Panteion 
University, Athens. 
• Prof Panayotis IOAKIMIDIS, Professor of European Politics, University of 
Athens, and Director, EKEM, and alternate member of the European 
Convention (Greek government representative), and Greek Foreign Ministry and 
Greek PM advisor. 
• Dr Dimitris KERIDIS, Director, Kokkalis Foundation, and Lecturer, University 
of Thessaloniki (Salonica). 
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• Prof Andreas MOSCHONAS, Jean Monnet Chair in European Sociological 
Studies, and Associate Professor of Sociology, and Director, European Centre, 
University of Crete. 
• Prof Stelios PERRAKIS, Associate Professor, Panteion University of Social and 
Political Sciences, Athens, and former Foreign Ministry Secretary-General. 
• Prof Panos TSAKALOYANNIS, Jean Monnet Chair in European Political 
Studies, Economic University of Athens. 
• Dr Charalambos TSARDANIDIS, Director, Institute for International 
Economic Relations, Athens. 
• Dr Aris TZIAMPIRIS, Lecturer in European Studies, University of Piraeus. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
OTHER EVENTS ATTENDED DURING FELLOWSHIP TENURE IN ATHENS 
WHICH ALL HAVE A DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THIS STUDY: 
 
• ELIAMEP, Athens and Foundation Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 
Thessaloniki Conference on ‘Greek-FYROM bilateral relations during the 
Interim Accord 1995-2002’ [in Greek]: Profs Veremis, Couloumbis, Gounaris, 
Drs Kofos, Zaikos, Tziampiris, Nikas, Kontonis, Vlasidis, Syrri (Athens, 11 
March 2003) 
 
• Independent Science and Technology Studies (IST) College event on ‘The war 
in Iraq and its implications for the European Union’ [in Greek]: Prof 
Theodore Couloumbis, ELIAMEP and University of Athens; Mr. A. 
Andrianopoulos, former minister; G. Romeos, former minister and former MEP 
(Athens, 17 March 2003) 
 
• OKE (Greek ECOSOC) and Greek Presidency event on ‘The Future of 
Europe’ [in Greek and in French]: Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the 
European Convention and Greek Parliament representative Marietta Giannakou 
(New Democracy MP) and Greek government (PASOK) alternate representative 
Prof Panayotis Ioakimidis (Athens, 8 April 2003) 
 
• ELIAMEP and EKEM (EPIN/European Policy Institutes Network) event on 
‘The Future of Europe and the Greek Presidency-A discussion on the work 
of the European Convention and on the role of Greece’ [in Greek]: Profs 
Papadimitriou, Kazakos, Ioakimidis, Tsoukalis, and Greek Parliament alternate 
representative Evriviades Stylianides (New Democracy) (Athens, 14 April 2003) 
 
• Lecture on ‘US foreign policy after Iraq’ [in English] by Professor Stanley 
Hoffmann organised by the Kokkalis Foundation and the Hellenic-American 
Union (Athens, 7 May 2003) 
 
• Lecture on ‘The Problem of Spain’ [in Spanish] by Professor Jose Luis Abellan 
organised by the Cervantes Institute in Athens (Athens, 8 May 2003) 
 
• Book presentation on ‘Theories of European integration’ [in Greek] by Dr 
Dimitris Chryssochoou, organised by the European Parliament Office in Greece 
(Athens, 15 May 2003) 
 
• EKEM’s Annual Kranidiotis Memorial Lecture by Defence Minister Yannos 
Papandoniou [in Greek] on ‘Greece in a new security environment’, Athens (16 
September 2003). 
 
I also gave the following lectures, talks and seminars: 
 
• Taught (in Greek) four times two-hour long lecture/seminars on Euro-
Mediterranean issues, and on ‘the democratic control of the CFSP and the 
ESDP’, MA in European and International Studies of the University of Athens 
(17, 26 March and 9 April and 5 May 2003). 
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• presented a paper (in Greek) on ‘EU foreign policy and Iraq: the democratic 
deficit dimension’ at IDOS/Institute of International Economic Relations (31 
April 2003). 
 
• presented a paper (in Greek) on ‘the democratic control of EU foreign and 
defence policy’ at IAA Institute of Defence Analyses (on 4 June 2003). 
 
• chaired a guest lecture (in English) by Dr Roderick Pace (University of Malta) on 
‘Malta and the EU’ organised by EKEM (10 June 2003). 
 
• presented a conference paper (in English) on ‘parliamentary diplomacy in Euro-
Mediterranean relations’ at a conference organised by the Greek Ministry of 
Information and Media in Athens (conference for journalists 30 June 2003). 
 
• chaired a session (in French) on ‘The EU, the USA and global governance’, 11th 
Summer Academy organised by Panteion University and the Hellenic University 
Association for European Studies, Spetses (1-5 July 2003)..  
 
• presented a joint paper on the European Parliament and the Mediterranean, 
Institute of International Economic Relations’ First Pan-Hellenic Conference on 
International Political Economy, Athens (19-21 September 2003). 
 
All these activities have further informed this study. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
RESEARCH INTERVIEW TOPICS 
 
 
1. EUROPEANISATION: CONCEPT AND THEORY 
 
2. EUROPEANISATION AND GREECE 
 
3. EUROPEANISATION AND GREEK FOREIGN POLICY 
 
4. CYPRUS – TURKEY 
 
5. ‘MACEDONIA;/FYROM and BALKANS 
 
6. MIDDLE EAST, ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
 
7. 2003 WAR ON IRAQ 
 
8. FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION DEBATE, including: 
CFSP/ESDP, GREEK PRESIDENCY 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
CARTOONS 
 
 
 
 
source: Kathimerini/English edition, 26.5.03 
 
On the ‘milking’ of the EU Presidency for domestic purposes (above and below) 
The first at a time when there were important job losses in Greece and the second 
during a dustmen’s strike in Athens. 
 46
 
 
source: Kathimerini/English edition, 5.5.03 
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source: Kathimerini/English edition, 10.6.03 
 
on ‘successful’ (sic) Europeanisation in foreign policy and not internally 
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source: Kathimerini/English edition, 7.4.03 
 
on the discrepancy between domestic discourse and discourse abroad during the 2003 
Iraq war 
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source: Kathimerini/English edition, five years anniversary of the English edition that 
is enclosed in the International Herald Tribune in Greece, 8-9 March 2003 
 
On how Europeanised Greece has really become! 
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